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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
unanswered was whether the general contractor could obtain tort immunity
by duplicating the insurance which the subcontractor carried.
The court, in the Thomas&3 case, regarded the general contractor
as "a volunteer in taking out insurance.. ."2 that the law did not require.
It was pointed out that the employee was not benefited by the fact that
two persons carried compensation insurance for his benefit. The court
concluded that immunity "is a benefit accruing from carrying compensation
insurance only in case the law imposes a duty to do so. . . ."2- By its
decision, the court has further restricted the concept of tort immunity
as applied to the general contractor.
It is to bc questioned whether the strict "no immunity" rule makes
sufficient allowance for the fact that one of the objectives of "statutory
employer" provisions is to give the general contractor an incentive to
require his subcontractors to carry insurance. 26 If the general contractor
does compel his subcontractors to provide the coverage, the general
contractor's reward, under the "no immunity" rle, is loss of exemption
from "third party" suits. Certainly, "a sounder result would seem to be
a holding that the overall responsibility of the general contractor for
getting subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for compensation
if lie does not, should bc sufficient to remove him from the category of
a 'third party'." 27 Thus, the general contractor is under a continuing
potential liability and has assumed a burden in exchange for which he
should be entitled to immunity from all "third party" damage suits.
JOSEPH P. METZGER
DUE PROCESS OF LAW - SUIT CLAUSES AS A DEFENSE
Defendant issued to plaintiff, in Illinois, a personal property floater
policy oii chattels then located in that state. Plaintiff subsequently moved
to Florida where his insured property was destroyed or stolen. A clause in
the policy required that suit be brought within twelve months after
discovery of the loss. Dcfendant denied liability and plaintiff brought suit
more than two years later in a federal court in Florida. The district court
held the clause void under the public policy of the state as declared in a
Florida statute which made illegal stipulations in any contract that
2L Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 175 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959).
24. Id. at 383.
25. Ibid.
26. 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COIPEN.SATio, " LAW § 72.31 (952).
27. Ibid.
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shortened the period of limitations.' Held, reversed: the "suit limiting
clause" in the policy constituted a substantive property right protected
by the fourteenth amendment, and in view of the forum's slight connection
with the substance of the contract obligations, a violation of due process
would result if the Florida statute were applied to this provision. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
Contractual provisions reasonably limiting the time within which
actions may be brought are generally valid.2 A number of states, however,
have enacted statutes3 making such stipulations void as against public
policy.4 Serious constitutional problems are presented when a "suit limiting
clause," valid where made, is used defensively5 in a jurisdiction that holds
such clauses unenforceable.6
To prevent contractually assumed obligations from being expanded
beyond original contemplation, certain constitutional safeguards have been
1. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1957) provides: "All provisions . . . in any contract
whatever . . . fixing the period of time in which suits may be instituted under any
such contract . . . at a period of time less than that provided by the statute of limitations
of this state, are hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy of this state, and
to be illegal and void. No court in this state shall give effect to any provision o
stipulation of the character mentioned in this section."
2. U.S.: Riddlesharger v. Hartford Fire his. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1869);
Colo.: Capitol Fire Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 131 Colo. 64, 279 P.2d 435(1955); Del.: Murray v. Lititz Mot. Ins. Co., 5 Terry 447, 61 A.2d 409 (Del. 1955);
Ky.: Johnson v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 298 Ky. 699, 183 S.W.2d 941 (1944); Burlew
v. Fidelitv & Cas. Co., 276 Ky. 132, 122 S.W.2d 990 (1938); Mass.: London Clothes,
Ltd. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 318 Mass. 692, 63 N.E.2d 577 (1945); Tenn.: Hill v. Home
Ins. Co., 22 Tenn. App. 429, 145 S.W.2d 800 (1941); Card v. Commercial Cas.
Ins. Co., 20 Tenn. App. 132, 95 S.W.2d 1281 (1936); Wis.: Criem v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 99 Wis. 530, 75 NAV. 67 (1898).
What has been considered reasonable by the courts usually depends upon the
particular factual pattern present for decision. Most policies state that action must be
brought within twelve months after the occurrence which gives rise to the claim. Rouse
v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 203 N.C. 345, 166 S.E. 177 (1932). Stipulations of six months
have been upheld: Griem v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 99 Wis. 530, 75 N.W. 67 (1898); ashave provisions requiring that action he brought within four months: Cunningham Leather
Co. v. Amcrican-llawaiian S.S. Co., 285 Mass. 232, 189 N.E. 98 (1934) (provision
included in hill of lading.)
Some states have statutes whereby insurance companies may not include a
limitation of less than one year in the policy: CONN. CEN. STAT. § 38-27 (1958);
VA. CODE § 38.1-341 (1950).
3. Ala.: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 28 (1940); Ariz.: Anma. REV. STAT. § 20-1115(1957); Fla.: FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1957); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-110 (1947);
Kan.: KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306 (1949); Miss.: Miss. CODE ANN. § 724 (1942);
AIo.: Mtfo. ANN. STAT. § 431.030 (Veron 1956); Mont.: MONT. REy. ConEs ANN.§ 13-806 (1947); N.D.: N.D. Rrv. CODE § 9-0805 (1943); Okla.: OKLA. S'rAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 216 (1937); S.C.: S.C. CODE § 10-116 (1952); S.D.: S.D. CODE § 10.0705
(1939).
4. Such provisions, when included in a contract executed in any of these states
would not be upheld there or in another jurisdiction, because a contract invalid where
made will not be given judicial enforcement in any state. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Hill,
214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244 (1926); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Smith, 13 SV.W2d 720(Tex. Civ. App. 1929). See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWs 226 (2d ed. 1951).
5. The courts have drawn a distinction between actions in which affirmative
enforcement is desired and those where a party is attempting to assert the suit clause
as a substantive defense. Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 54 F. Supp.
145 (S.D. Fla. 1944) discusses the difference. It is the only case which has interpreted
the Florida statute under a similar fact pattern. In the Holderness case, the insurance
1960]
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established. Thus it has been said that once these obligations lawfully
vest, they cannot be ignored by a sister state on the grounds of its public
policy.7 When expressed within the framework of the fourteenth amend-
ment, due process will not permit the forum to widen the limits of
liability as established by the contract in accordance with the law of the
place where made.8
In the case of Hartford Accident 6 Indemnity Co. v. Delta 6 Pine
Land Co.," which expanded the doctrine of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,")
policy was executed in North Carolina on property located there, which was destroyed
there. The Florida district court would not deny enforcement to the policy's suit
limiting clause as Florida's contacts were not sufficient to warrant the application of the
statute. In Ciampittiello v. Ciampittiello, 134 Conn. 51, 57, 54 A.2d 669, 671 (1947), the
parties entered into a gambling contract in Rhode Island where it was enforceable. The
Connecticut court would not enforce plaintiff's claim stating that it contravened the
"ancient and deep rooted public policy of this state and therefore cannot be enforced
in our courts." In Lloyd v. Cooper Corp., 101 Fla. 533, 134 So. 562 (1931), the
Florida court declined to enforce a note executed by a married woman in Illinois. when
she could not have executed such a note in Florida. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of
New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
6. The court must decide whcther the statute was intended to apply to interstate
as well as intrastate transactions. In the absence of express legislative intent to the
contrary, such statutes are usually enacted with only the intrastate situation in mind,
notwithstanding the use of such broad terms as "any contract." See FLA. STrAT. § 95.03
(1957); Cheatham & Reese, Choice 6f the Applicable Law, 52 CoL.m L. Rv.
959, 975 (1952).
Insurance policies are generally construed as contracts made where the first premium
is paid and the policy delivered. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson,
293 U.S. 335 (1934); Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Mixon, 79 Fla. 420,
84 So. 171 (1920); American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & NMfg. Co., 74 Fla. 130,
77 So. 168 (1917), aff'd, 250 U.S. 2 (1919); National Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Whitlock,
198 Okla. 561, 180 P.2d 647 (1946).
Most courts have solved the problem by looking to the lax locus contractus.
Impressed with the need for uniformity and certainty of adjudication, these courts have
used the rules of conflict of laws to obtain the same result as if suit were brought
at the locus contractus. Brooks v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America, 47 F.2d 618
(E.D.N.Y. 1931); Clarey v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ky. 510, 136 S.. 1014
(1911).
7. lartford Ace. & Inden. Co. v. I)elta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934);
Ilore Iss. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
8. Ibid.
9, 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
10. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In the Dick case, Texas denied the insurer the benefit of a
suit limitation stipulation where the only interest that Texas had was that the insured
was a resident of the state. The United States Supreme Court recognized that had the
Texas courts been permitted to increase the obligations of the insurer and thereby impose
burdens for which lie had not contracted, he would have been deprived of his property
without due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that this
property right could not he abrogated even in the name of the public policy of Texas.
Sonme state courts have made the same error as Texas did, apparently overlooking
the constitutional issue of deprivation of property without due process of law. Galliher v.
State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Ala. 543, 43 So. 833 (1907); Gulf Ins. Co. v. lolland
Constr. Co., 218 Ark. 405, 236 S.W.2d 1003 (1951). Contra, Miller v. American
Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954). In the Miller case, the
court enforced an arbitration clause that was valid by the law of Texas where the policy
was written and delivered, although if such a clause had been contained in an Arkansas
contract it would not have been upheld, there being a statute in Arkansas forbidding
arbitration in insurance policies. The federal court in Miller appears to have overlooked
the decision of the Arkansas court in the Gulf case. In that case, the court held that
the particular clause was like a statute of limitations, that it was procedural rather
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the Mississippi court, based on grounds of public policy and state law,
refused to allow the insurer to defensively assert a suit limitation clause.
This, in effect, resulted in an extension of the insurer's liability beyond
the contractually agreed upon limits. In reversing the Mississippi court, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held that enforcement of such
a legislative policy without first considering "the relative importance of
the interests of the forum as contrasted with those created at the place of
the contract conflicts with the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 1
The Court, in Delta 6 Pine Land, recognized that there would be
cases "in which enforcement of a contract as made outside a state may
be so repugnant to its vital interests as to justify enforcement in a
different manner." 12 This exception to the protection given vested property
interests by the fourteenth amendment is best exemplified by Watson v.
Employers Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd."a In Watson, the United States
Supreme Court held that Louisiana could, under its direct action statute,
deny the insurer the benefit of a clause, valid where made, that suit
could not be brought against the insurer until after suit had been brought
against the manufacturer. The issue involved in Watson was not whether
liability was barred, as in Delta 6 Pine Land, but rather whether the
injured party could obtain a procedural advantage against the insurer.14
The Court, using the same "interest-contact" approach in 'Watson as was
used in the Sun Insurance case, felt that "Louisiana's legitimate interest
in safeguarding the rights of persons injured there"15 was vital enough to
permit local law to be asserted over the lex locus contractus. Thus, the
Watson case does not seem inconsistent with the Delta 6 Pine Land case,
nor would it dictate a contrary result than that reached by the court in the
Sun Insurance case ,' 6
than substantive and would be controlled by the law of the forum. Althouh both cases
dealt with different statutes, the reasoning applied by the Arkansas -court would
inescapably lead to a contrary result from that reached by the federal court. Professor
Leflar believes that the Arkansas court may unknowingly have run afoul of the Due
Process Clause by holding that the suit clause was procedural. He referred to Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick. 281 U.S. 397 (1930), where the United States Supreme Court held
that an almost identical clause was substantive and that the Texas courts violated the
Due Process Clause when they disregarded the suit clause by characterizing it as
procedural. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: 1948-54, 9 ARK. L. REv. 1, 4 (1955). It is
submitted that the federal court in Miller reached the correct result and would not
have had to follow the state law if it violated the United States Constitution. See
Sampson v. Channell, 110 FX2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
11. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150
(1934).
12. Ibid.
13. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
14. The manufaeturer was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts,
and plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, would have been put to the inconvenience and
expense of bringing suit in another state.
15. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
16. Professor Ehrenzwcig contends that Watson has supplanted the general rule
of Delta b Pine Land, and stands for the proposition that "mandatory dismissal under
the constitutional compulsion of due process has in effect been abandoned." EiirENzwncI,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 140 (1959).
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As this action was based on diversity of citizenship, the federal court
had to look to the substantive law,' 7 the conflict of laws rules,' 8 and the
public policy"O of the state in which it was sitting. The court avoided the
difficult question of whether a Florida court would apply its statute
prohibiting "suit limiting clauses" by following the dictumn in Sampson v.
Channell,20 wherein Judge Magruder commented that a federal court
sitting in diversity was not bound to apply what it thought state law to be
if such an application would result in a violation of the United States
Constitution. 2 1 The court in the instant case concluded that Florida's
connections with the contract were insufficient to effectuate its own
public policy by striking down a clause which was valid where made. 2
By comparison, the "interests" of Mississippi in the Delta 6 Pine
Land case and those of Florida in the Sun Insurance case are strikingly
parallel. In both cases, the contract was entered into outside the forum,
property was the subject matter of the insurance policy, the "suit limiting
clause" was lawful where made, neither the bonded employee nor the
insured property was in the forum state at the time of the contract's
execution, the loss occurred in the forum, and as a result enforcement
wvas sought therein. It is interesting to further note that although both
contracts were transitory in nature, in Delta 6 Pine Land the insurer
and the insured were licensed to do business in Mississippi, and twenty-one
of the insured's bonded employees were then working there. Based on
these facts, there was a possibility that if a loss did occur, it might very
well happen in Mississippi. At least the geographical locale of possible loss
was within the contemplation of both parties as contrasted with the
fortuity of the insured's moving to Florida in the Sun Insurance case.
By following and reaffirming the standards of due process established
in Delta 6 Pine Land, the Sun Insurance case again illuminates the
pitfall inherent in the application of a forum's public policy concepts
as an exception to conflict of laws rules without giving due regard for
underlying constitutional norms. The present case clearly indicates that
17. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Urda v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 211 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1954).
18. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elce. Mfg. Co., 31 U.S. 486 (1941).
19. Griffin v. Mcoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Stahl v. Township of Teaneck,
162 F. Supp. 661 (DI.N.. 19581.
20. 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir., cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
21. The court, in the Sun Insurance case, after reviewing Florida authority, believed
that Florida would not attempt to apply either the statute or its ideas of public policy
to contracts which were valid where entered into, but felt that it did not have to
make that difficult decision.
22. The dissenting indge in the Sun Insurance case disregarded due process con-
siderations and argued that the Florida lcgislature could protect its residents against
the offending suit clause regardless of where the contract was executed. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 1959). His contention was clearly
refuted by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930),
where he noted that insofar as due process of law was concerned, it was immaterial that
Dick was a permanent resident of Texas.
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in the absence of sufficient interests, a "suit limiting clause" can not be
characterized as being so repugnant to a state's vital interests as to justify
its being disregarded on the basis of public policy. What factors will be
legally sufficient to balance the demands of due process against the public
policy of the forum have not yet been decided in this area, and will be
subject to final determination through review by the United States
Supreme Court.23
REUBEN M. SCHNEIDER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH WITHOUT
WARRANT UNDER STATE POLICE POWER
The defendant's refusal to permit entry to the Commisioner of
Health, who acted after finding a pile of rat-infested debris on defendant's
property, resulted in a fine under the Baltimore City Code,' which permits
daylight demands for entry without warrant by the Commissioner. Held:
a penalty imposed for resisting the inspection of a health official, without
warrant, prompted by a danger to the public health, does not violate due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Frank v. State of Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
The authorization of searches by an administrative officer without
warrant, under the state police power, has undergone a progressive develop-
ment in the law. It is acknowledged that the guaranty of the fourth
amcndment to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, does
not apply directly to state actions. 2 However, that security is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, and as such, enforceable against the
states through the Due Process Clause." Generally, this limitation has
been construed to allow reasonable searches by implications and has not
been held enforceable against the unlawful acts of individuals in which
the government has no part." A search without a warrant demands
23. Sun. Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
361 U.S. 874 (1959).
1. BALTIMORF, ND., HEALTH COnE art. 12, §120 (1950): "Whenever the Com-
missioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar
or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the daytime, and if the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal the sun of Twenty Dollars."
2. \Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914); National Safe Deposit Co.
v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1896).
3, Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
4. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1914); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1946); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
5. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. Jordan, 79 F. Supp. '11 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
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